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Locating Affordable Housing: The Legal System’s 
Misallocation of Subsidized Housing Incentives 
BRANDON M. WEISS† 
The primary goal of subsidized housing policy in the United States is to increase access to 
affordable housing for low-income households. Yet data show that states disproportionately 
award low-income housing tax credits to finance the development of projects in neighborhoods 
where there is already a relatively high number of housing units available at similar rent levels. 
Through a fifty-state study of state housing agency allocation rules, this Article evaluates the 
legal apparatus that facilitates this “misallocation problem.” I find that approximately seventy-
five percent of states fail to make the provision of below-market rents a threshold requirement 
of receiving an award of low-income housing tax credits. As a result, locational choices often 
are dictated by private developers who are incentivized to develop where land is cheapest. I 
argue that states should revise their allocation rules to ensure that, as a default, tax credits are 
awarded to projects that offer at least a ten percent rent advantage as compared to the local 
private market. The Article considers challenges to this proposal related to lack of state housing 
agency autonomy, federal framework limitations, land costs, and local political opposition and, 
in each case, offers a variety of responses.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Housing affordability remains a persistent challenge for households across 
the United States. This reality is particularly true for those at the bottom of the 
income distribution. For every one hundred extremely low-income renter 
households, only thirty-five units of affordable housing are available.1 The result 
of this affordability gap is severe and no less detrimental despite its familiarity: 
children grow up in substandard housing that has lifelong impacts on health 
outcomes,2 families are forced to make painful tradeoffs between housing and 
 
 1. See NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOMES 2 (2017) 
(defining “extremely low-income households” as households whose income is at or below 30% of the applicable 
area median income (AMI) or whose income is at or below the poverty line; defining “affordability” as paying 
no more than 30% of household income on rent and utilities). The report makes similar findings for renter 
households that earn 50% of AMI—for every one hundred such households, only fifty-five units of housing are 
affordable and available. Id. at 5. 
 2. See Michael Weitzman et al., Housing and Child Health, 43 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRIC & 
ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 187 (2013) (noting the significant developmental impacts of substandard housing).  
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other necessities,3 and, most extremely, more than half a million Americans go 
homeless on any given night.4 
Given the costs of land and housing production, coupled with restrictive 
local land use regulatory regimes, the private market alone will not solve this 
problem. Since the 1930s, the federal government has experimented with 
programs aimed at filling this housing gap.5 The U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD), the federal agency presently charged with 
administering the bulk of such programs, has an annual budget of approximately 
fifty billion dollars.6 Nonetheless, unlike typical “entitlement programs,” at 
current funding levels only one in four households that is income-eligible for 
assistance receives it.7  
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program has replaced 
public housing as the primary federal program aimed at producing new units of 
housing affordable to low-income households. While only approximately one 
million units of public housing remain,8 the LIHTC program has produced 
roughly three million units of subsidized housing.9 Despite being hailed as the 
most successful federal subsidized housing production program in history,10 the 
program has faced a number of critiques, including that it: ignores federal civil 
rights laws;11 is inefficient;12 leaves tenants more rent-burdened than other 
 
 3. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 33–34 
(Marcia Fernald ed., 2017) [hereinafter 2017 JCHS REPORT] (finding that low-income households significantly 
cut back on food, transportation, and healthcare consumption when housing costs take up most of their income). 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 2016 CONTINUUM OF CARE HOMELESS ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAMS HOMELESS POPULATIONS AND SUBPOPULATIONS 1 (2017), 
http://www.hudexchange.info/resource/reportmanagement/published/CoC_PopSub_NatlTerrDC_2016 
.pdf. 
 5. See Charles L. Edson, Affordable Housing—An Intimate History, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 193 (2011) (reviewing the history of major federal subsidized housing programs).  
 6. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2018 BUDGET 1–9 (2017), 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=FY_18_CJS_COMBINED.PDF. 
 7. See 2017 JCHS REPORT, supra note 3, at 37 (“For the 75 percent of eligible households that are eligible 
for assistance but do not receive it, affordable housing choices are in increasingly limited supply.”). 
 8. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, UNITED STATES FACT SHEET: FEDERAL RENTAL 
ASSISTANCE 1 (2017) (reporting that 1,020,000 households are currently assisted by public housing).  
 9. See Office of Policy Dev. & Research, Low Income Housing Tax Credits, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html [hereinafter HUDUSER] (last updated June 6, 
2018) (noting the 3.05 million units produced by the LIHTC program through 2016).  
 10. See, e.g., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE DISRUPTION OF THE LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, RESPONSES, AND PROPOSED CORRECTIVES 13 
(2009), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/disruption_of_the_lihtc_program_2009_0.pdf 
(“The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program is widely regarded as the most successful affordable 
housing production and preservation program in the nation’s history.”). 
 11. Florence Wagman Roisman, Mandates Unsatisfied: The Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program 
and the Civil Rights Laws, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1998).  
 12. See Michael A. Stegman, The Excessive Costs of Creative Finance: Growing Inefficiencies in the 
Production of Low-Income Housing, 2 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 357, 370 (1991) (arguing that the high 
transaction costs make the program inefficient). But see Michael A. Stegman, Comment on Jean L. Cummings 
and Denise DiPasquale’s “The Low Income Housing Tax Credit: An Analysis of the First Ten Years”: Lifting 
the Veil of Ignorance, 10 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 321, 323 (1999) (stating that as the program matured over the 
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federal subsidized housing programs;13 fails to reach the lowest-income 
households;14 and will create a sizeable problem, beginning in 2020, when rent 
restrictions start to expire and low-income tenants may face the risk of 
eviction.15  
Notwithstanding these critiques, the LIHTC program has garnered 
significant bipartisan support in Congress since its creation in 1986.16 The recent 
tax reform effort preserved the program in its entirety despite numerous efforts 
to cut similar tax credits.17 The program provides approximately eight billion 
dollars annually in federal support for subsidized housing production18 and 
continues to produce more than one hundred thousand housing units every 
year.19 As a permanent tax credit, the program is insulated from annual partisan 
battles over congressional funding appropriations. When state housing finance 
agencies (HFAs) allocate the credits strategically, they can avoid, or at least 
alleviate, some of the classic critiques of the program.20 While some have 
 
first ten years, it has become “a sophisticated and increasingly efficient low-income rental housing production 
system”). 
 13. See Anne R. Williamson, Can They Afford the Rent? Resident Cost Burden in Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit Developments, 47 URB. AFF. REV. 775, 794 (2011) (“[T]he LIHTC appears to serve households 
without vouchers in a narrow income range (50% to 60% AMI) relatively well, but leaves lower income tenants 
cost burdened—some, severely cost burdened.”). 
 14. See Katherine M. O’Regan & Keren M. Horn, What Can We Learn About the Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit Program by Looking at the Tenants? 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 597, 609 (2013) (“[R]elative to 
households assisted by the other largest federally assisted rental programs, LIHTC recipients have higher 
incomes.”).  
 15. See Brandon M. Weiss, Residual Value Capture in Subsidized Housing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
521, 546, 563 (2016) (finding that starting in 2020 and continuing until 2043, the thirty-year rent restrictions on 
more than two million LIHTC properties will expire, subjecting the low-income residents to potential 
displacement). 
 16. See America’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Challenges and Solutions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Fin., 115th Cong. 1 (2017) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (“As many of you 
are aware, the last time we underwent a national, comprehensive revision of the tax code was in 1986, with the 
passage of the Tax Reform Act. At that time, affordable housing tax incentives were baked into statute, with the 
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit being chief among them. Since then, this important section of the tax code has 
enjoyed bipartisan support.”). 
 17. See Michael Novogradac et al., Tax Reform and Its Consequences for Affordable Rental Housing, 27 
J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 107, 108 (2018) (“The 2017 tax reform legislation . . . was 
responsible for the most sweeping changes to the Internal Revenue Code . . . [but], nothing in the Act directly 
addressed affordable housing.”). 
 18. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 26 (2014). 
 19. See HUDUSER, supra note 9 (“An average of over 1,435 projects and 108,810 units were placed in 
service annually between 1995 to 2016.”). For the twenty-year period spanning 1987–2006, LIHTC-financed 
units constituted approximately one-third of all multifamily rental housing constructed in the United States. 
OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH , U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND? xi (2012).  
 20. For example, coupling LIHTC financing with Section 8 assistance can help the program reach 
households at the lowest income levels. See O’Regan & Horn, supra note 14, at 609 (“The extent to which states 
serve households with the lowest incomes is highly correlated with the extent to which LIHTC tenants receive 
other rental assistance.”). 
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recommended dramatic overhauls to current federal subsidized housing policy,21 
until such approaches become politically viable, the LIHTC program, as 
essentially the only federal subsidized housing production program in town, is 
worth improving.  
Of course not all agree on the best credit allocation strategy. In a 2015 
United States Supreme Court case, the Inclusive Communities Project sued the 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs for its allocation of 
LIHTCs.22 The nonprofit community advocacy group claimed that the 
department had violated the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) by 
disproportionately awarding credits to developments located in majority 
nonwhite neighborhoods, having the effect of perpetuating residential racial 
segregation.23 The Court did not decide the merits of the underlying claim, but 
for the first time it endorsed the disparate impact method of proving a violation 
of the FHA.24  
The lawsuit served as a modern incarnation of a long-standing housing 
policy debate: whether the government should allocate scarce housing subsidy 
resources to build projects in relatively lower-income central city 
neighborhoods, occupied disproportionately by nonwhite households, or 
whether such resources should be directed to relatively higher-income, 
predominately white suburban communities. On the one hand, an increasing 
body of research shows that life outcomes are improved when young children 
move to so-called “communities of opportunity.”25 In this vein, California 
recently revised its LIHTC allocation methodology to incorporate detailed 
 
 21. See, e.g., Bruce Katz & Margery Austin Turner, Rethinking U.S. Rental Housing Policy: A New 
Blueprint for Federal, State, and Local Action, in REVISITING RENTAL HOUSING: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND 
PRIORITIES 319, 342–54 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008); Peter Marcuse & W. Dennis Keating, 
The Permanent Housing Crisis: The Failures of Conservatism and the Limitations of Liberalism, in A RIGHT TO 
HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 139, 139–162 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 2006). 
 22. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 23. Id. at 2514. 
 24. Id. at 2525–26. Under the disparate impact method, a plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent, 
but instead must establish that the challenged policy or action has a discriminatory effect on a protected class. 
See Michael G. Allen et al., Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 49 HARV. 
C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 155, 160 (2014).  
 25. See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New 
Evidence from the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855, 856 (2016) (finding that 
moving to a lower-poverty neighborhood before the age of thirteen leads to a reduction in single parenthood 
rates and an increase in earnings and college attendance); see also Brief of Leo T. McCarthy Center for Public 
Service and the Common Good and Forty-Five Housing Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant and 
Respondent City of San Jose at 40, Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (2015) (No. 
S212072) (presenting detailed data and analysis regarding the “Geography of Opportunity”: “Most Americans 
readily appreciate the importance of growing up in the right neighborhood. Decades of empirical research 
validate these intuitions, and vividly illustrate a powerful series of relationships between family residence and 
an individual’s projected life chances along a number of scales. The geographically varying set of institutions, 
systems and markets dramatically influence a person’s achieved socioeconomic status. Together, these 
institutions, systems and markets constitute the ‘opportunity structure.’” (citing George Galster, Urban 
Opportunity Structure and Racial/Ethnic Polarization, in RESEARCH ON SCHOOLS, NEIGHBORHOODS AND 
COMMUNITIES 47, 47–66 (William F. Tate, IV ed., 2012))).  
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“opportunity mapping” that gives preference to projects located in areas that 
score well across a variety of indicators and filters.26 On the other hand, many 
are wary of repeating past mistakes of disinvesting in low-income communities 
of color.27  
Worthy arguments are made on both sides of this debate. Housing policy 
should be concerned with both increasing access to housing opportunities in 
neighborhoods that are unaffordable to low-income households, as well as 
investing in neighborhoods where rents are already affordable but where 
targeted subsidies can help spur broader neighborhood revitalization. Our 
housing policy should be nimble and serve a multitude of purposes depending 
on what local circumstances warrant. What is most important is that scarce 
housing incentives be deployed in a manner that serves underlying public policy 
goals rather than, for example, allowing private market forces to dictate 
locational outcomes. 
Unfortunately, research discussed herein shows that our primary low-
income housing production tool is not being used particularly nimbly. More than 
ninety percent of LIHTCs are awarded to projects located in neighborhoods 
where there is already a relatively high number of housing units available at 
similar rent levels.28 In other words, the restricted rent levels required by the 
program are at, or not significantly below, the rents already offered by the local 
 
 26. CAL. FAIR HOUS. TASKFORCE, REVISED OPPORTUNITY MAPPING METHODOLOGY 1–2, 
http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/ctcac/opportunity/methodology.pdf (last updated Dec. 8, 2017) (“Opportunity 
mapping is a tool for understanding how public and private resources are spatially distributed. ‘Opportunity,’ 
loosely defined, can be thought of as all of the pathways to better lives, including through health, education, and 
employment. Mapping these pathways involves quantifying positive or negative attributes of neighborhoods 
using data from multiple sources, and conveying the information in a visual format. In essence, opportunity maps 
are intended to display which areas, according to research, offer low-income children and adults the best chance 
at economic advancement, high educational attainment, and good physical and mental health. . . . The tool is 
intended to inform regulations related to the siting of 9% new construction, large-family LIHTC developments 
in California, which have historically been concentrated in low-resource and segregated areas. It is the 
taskforce’s intent that the mapping tool be used in conjunction with new regulations to help incentivize more 
housing opportunities for families to live in high-resourced neighborhoods. The taskforce intends for the 
application of this tool to be part of a balanced statewide policy approach that increases access for low-income 
families to high-resource neighborhoods where there historically have been limited affordable housing 
opportunities, and provides investments to revitalize under-resourced neighborhoods.”).  
 27. For detailed accounts of how prior federal housing policies and practices, like redlining, historically 
led to disinvestment in low-income communities of color, see generally KEVIN FOX GOTHAM, RACE, REAL 
ESTATE, AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: THE KANSAS CITY EXPERIENCE, 1900–2010 (2d ed. 2014); RICHARD 
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 
(2017). Justice Kennedy’s decision in Inclusive Communities expressed ambivalence about subjecting states to 
liability for opting to invest in the urban core rather than the suburbs:  
It would be paradoxical to construe the FHA to impose onerous costs on actors who encourage 
revitalizing dilapidated housing in our Nation’s cities merely because some other priority might seem 
preferable. . . . From the standpoint of determining advantage or disadvantage to racial minorities, it 
seems difficult to say as a general matter that a decision to build low-income housing in a blighted 
inner-city neighborhood instead of a suburb is discriminatory, or vice versa. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 28. See infra Part II.  
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housing market. Current policy thus appears to skew heavily away from 
furthering the goal of increasing housing opportunities in neighborhoods that are 
presently unaffordable to low-income households.29  
Why would state housing finance agencies allocate scarce affordable 
housing incentives in a manner that does so little to produce below-market rents? 
That is the question this Article seeks to answer. Through a fifty-state analysis 
of LIHTC allocation rules, this Article aims to evaluate the legal apparatus that 
results in this “misallocation problem.”  
Though a federal tax credit, the LIHTC program is primarily administered 
by the states. Each state receives an annual per capita allocation of tax credits 
that it in turn awards to private real estate developers.30 States are required to 
enact a “qualified allocation plan” (QAP) that sets forth the scoring criteria used 
to evaluate proposed projects submitted by developers,31 and those proposals 
that score the highest based on the QAP criteria receive an award of tax credits.32 
The QAPs thus play an instrumental role in setting state allocation priorities.  
Although the federal government leaves much discretion to the states 
regarding the content of the QAPs, the federal rules do require that developers 
submit a market study of the “housing needs of low-income individuals in the 
area to be served by the project.”33 Presumably, this is the mechanism Congress 
envisioned would facilitate the delivery of below-market rents.  
In the first comprehensive analysis of QAP market study requirements, this 
Article explores why the market study mechanism has failed to achieve this goal. 
Analysis of all fifty QAPs and their respective market study requirements shows 
that states vary widely with respect to the effectiveness of ensuring that tax 
credits are allocated to projects where the LIHTC restricted rent levels are below 
local market rents. In particular, the analysis shows that approximately three 
quarters of states fail to make the provision of below-market rents a default 
threshold requirement of, or even an explicit advantage in the competition for, 
LIHTCs. An emphasis on project financial viability—a worthy goal and an 
improvement over prior housing programs—has come at the expense of 
achieving the original policy aim: namely, ensuring a net increase in 
affordability. As a result, as discussed herein, locational choices often are left to 
the discretion of private developers who are incentivized to develop where land 
is cheapest. 
 
 29. Recent research also finds that “compared with other rental units, LIHTC units are located in 
neighborhoods with higher poverty rates, weaker labor markets, more polluted environments, and lower 
performing schools.” Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Gateway to Opportunity? Disparities in Neighborhood 
Conditions Among Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Residents, 28 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 572, 572 (2018).  
 30. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(C) (2012). 
 31. Id. § 42(m)(1)(A)–(B). 
 32. Id. Note that there actually are two different tax credits under the federal program: 9% and 4% credits. 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 10327(c)(2)(A)–(B) (2018). Only the 9% credits are allocated competitively. Id. 
§ 10327(A)(i)–(iii). 
 33. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(A)(iii). 
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I further describes the nature and 
scope of the misallocation problem. Part II provides a detailed analysis of the 
fifty state QAPs and market study requirements and presents findings regarding 
the legal apparatus that gives rise to the misallocation problem. Part III considers 
various neighborhood scenarios to demonstrate that ensuring financial viability 
alone is insufficient to guarantee that a project will further the goals of the 
LIHTC program. Part IV addresses obstacles to fixing the misallocation problem 
related to housing finance agency autonomy, federal framework limitations, land 
costs, and local political opposition. Finally, this Article concludes with the 
recommendation that states should revise their allocation rules to ensure that, as 
a default rule, LIHTCs are awarded to projects that offer at least a ten percent 
rent advantage. Exceptions to this rule in the case of a gentrifying neighborhood 
or a neighborhood subject to a concerted community revitalization plan are also 
considered.  
I.  THE MISALLOCATION PROBLEM 
Congress intended the LIHTC program, enacted as part of the 
comprehensive Tax Reform Act of 1986,34 to address a “national housing crisis” 
consisting of a “lack of decent, affordable housing.”35 The program does this by 
providing tax credits to housing developers who typically transfer them to 
investors in exchange for equity used to construct housing.36 To obtain the award 
of tax credits, developers must agree to certain rent and income limitations that 
are recorded on title of the underlying property.37  
Contrary to the common misperception that the LIHTC program, like 
public housing, is aimed at housing the poorest members of society, the program 
actually does not provide shelter for the lowest-income households. Rather the 
standard federal rules of the program require that 20% of the units in a LIHTC 
development be affordable to households making at or below 50% of the area 
median income (AMI), or that 40% of the units be affordable to households 
making at or below 60% of AMI.38 Housing affordability is defined as 
households paying no more than 30% of their gross income for housing.39 Given 
 
 34. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26 U.S.C.). 
 35. 132 CONG. REC. 14,924 (1986) (statement of Sen. Kerry).  
 36. For further explanation and data related to equity investment in LIHTC projects, see COHNREZNICK 
LLP, HOUSING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENTS: HIGH PERFORMANCE AND INCREASED NEED 28–29 (2017), 
http://www.cohnreznick.com/-/media/resources/cr_lihtc_sept2017.pdf. 
 37. For a more comprehensive description of the mechanics of the LIHTC program, see Weiss, supra note 
15, at 534–40. 
 38. I.R.C. § 42(g)(1). Note that in 2018, Congress amended the LIHTC statute to allow for a third “Average 
Income Test.” Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 103, 132 Stat. 348, 131 (to be 
codified at I.R.C. § 42(g)). This new option allows developers to include units that are affordable to households 
making up to 80% of AMI in its calculation of restricted units, so long as 40% of the units are so restricted and 
the average of the income limitations does not exceed 60% of AMI. Id.  
 39. I.R.C. § 42(g)(2)(A). This is the standard definition used across federal housing programs. The LIHTC 
program is unique among federal housing subsidy programs in that program participants can continue to be rent-
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that developers compete for credit allocations at the state level, often they will 
propose rents at levels lower than these baseline requirements to make their 
applications more attractive to the allocating agency. As a result, the program 
typically produces housing affordable to households that earn approximately 
30% to 60% of AMI.40 While these households earn significantly below the 
median income, they are not the lowest-income earners. Thus, without additional 
rental assistance, such as that provided by the Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher program, LIHTC housing is unaffordable to those at the very bottom 
of the income ladder. 
Nonetheless, households in the 30% to 60% of AMI range face significant 
housing challenges. Kirk McClure, one of the nation’s foremost experts on the 
LIHTC program, has found that 4,900 census tracts have a “demonstrable 
shortage” of units affordable to households in the 30% to 60% of AMI income 
range.41 Given this shortage, if the LIHTC program effectively increased the 
housing stock available to households in the 30% to 60% of AMI range in these 
census tracts, the program would be achieving its goal of addressing the lack of 
decent, affordable housing for low-income households.  
Unfortunately, this is not the case. McClure found that over a five-year 
period, of the 458,000 units produced by the LIHTC program, 428,000 of them 
were developed in census tracts that had a surplus of units affordable to 
households at the 30% to 60% of AMI level.42 This pattern held across area 
type—central cities, suburbs, and non-metropolitan areas all saw more than 90% 
of their LIHTC units developed in tracts with a surplus of units.43 McClure 
concluded that the data “suggest[] that the LIHTC program, despite the market 
analysis requirement, is largely indifferent to market need in the placement of 
 
burdened (spending more than 30% of gross income on housing), and even severely rent-burdened (spending 
50% or more of gross income on housing). See 2017 JCHS REPORT, supra note 3, at 5 (providing similar 
definitions for cost-burdened and severely cost-burdened households). The program’s rent and income limits do 
not prevent this. For example, a unit may qualify for the program by promising to charge residents no more than 
30% of the applicable 60% AMI level as its rent limit, and by promising only to rent the apartment to households 
earning below 60% AMI as its income limit. Under the rules of the program, the owner could rent this apartment 
to a household that only earns 40% of AMI. Assuming the owner charged the maximum permissible rent (30% 
of 60% of AMI), the owner would be in compliance with the rules of the program, and yet the household would 
be paying significantly more than 30% of its actual household income on rent. As Anne Williamson and others 
have found, a significant number of households residing in LIHTC units, particularly those who do not receive 
additional rental assistance, experience rent burdens. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 13, at 777. Williamson 
found that 91.2% of LIHTC households in Florida without additional rental assistance are rent-burdened, and 
that 15.0% of such households suffer from severe rent burdens. Id. at 791. Another study looking at eighteen 
states found that 70.5% of otherwise unassisted LIHTC households are rent-burdened, with 20.1% of such 
households suffering from severe rent burdens. See O’Regan & Horn, supra note 14, at 606 tbl. 5. 
 40. Kirk McClure, Are Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Developments Locating Where There Is a 
Shortage of Affordable Units?, 20 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 153, 156 (2010).  
 41. Id. at 162.  
 42. Id. at 164. 
 43. Id.  
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affordable units; if anything, it leans toward providing units where they are not 
needed.”44 
McClure recently updated his data as part of testimony submitted to the 
United States Senate Committee on Finance in a hearing dedicated to evaluating 
the LIHTC program.45 Based on 2015 data from the American Community 
Survey and 2017 data from HUD’s LIHTC database, McClure found that less 
than 9% of LIHTC units are located in census tracts where there is a shortage of 
units affordable to households with incomes in the range typically served by the 
program.46 Even more strikingly, he found that “over one-half of all LIHTC units 
are in tracts with a surplus of more than 50 units. One-fourth of all LIHTC units 
are in tracts with a surplus of 200 or more units.”47  
It must be noted that McClure’s figures may undercount the actual shortage 
of units available to households in this income range, since households with 
higher or lower incomes may occupy a portion of the units in this range.48 This 
effect is likely offset to some degree by the fact that not every household in the 
30% to 60% of AMI band occupies a unit of housing in this range. Further 
research is necessary to determine if certain census tracts deemed “surplus” 
tracts would be better categorized as “shortage” tracts when considering these 
factors.49 Given the pervasiveness of McClure’s findings, however, it is unlikely 
that these dynamics would upset his basic conclusion that a large number of 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. See America’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Challenges and Solutions, supra note 16, at 58–62 (prepared 
written statement of Kirk McClure).  
 46. Id. at 60.  
 47. Id.  
 48. McClure, supra note 40, at 162. (“[A] surplus of units does not mean that renter households in the 30 
to 60% of AMFI category will find units readily available. Rather, these units are available to all renter 
households, and many renter households with higher levels of income choose to occupy units in this price range 
to lower their housing cost burden.”); see also Paul Emrath, Comment on Kirk McClure’s “Are Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credit Developments Locating Where There Is a Shortage of Affordable Units?,” 20 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 173, 174 (2010) (“Moreover, units being usurped by households who could afford more 
expensive accommodations constitute only one of the possibilities. Another is that severely cost-burdened 
households with incomes below 30% of AMFI occupy units that would seem more appropriate for typical 
LIHTC tenants . . . .”). Presumably this dynamic also occurs in those tracts already deemed by McClure to have 
a shortage, thus further exacerbating the need in those areas. 
 49. Of course factors other than price also influence the ultimate “availability” of a unit, such as the 
likelihood of a landlord to comply with fair housing laws, to accept a Section 8 voucher, or to accept relatively 
low credit scores. For example, owners of LIHTC projects are barred from discriminating against tenants on the 
basis of their status as a recipient of Section 8 rental assistance. I.R.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv) (2012). This is an 
additional positive way in which LIHTC projects increase access to affordable housing. However, a growing 
number of states and local jurisdictions have addressed this issue simply by passing laws directly banning this 
type of “source of income” discrimination in all rental housing. See generally POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH 
ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING 
MOBILITY PROGRAM, https://prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf (last updated Sept. 14, 2018). Spending $8 billion 
annually on the LIHTC program would seem an expensive way to obtain a similar policy outcome if the program 
is not also providing additional access to affordable housing in the form of lower rents. This Article thus is 
primarily focused on the issue of “availability” as it relates to price.  
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LIHTC projects are developed in census tracts with a surplus of similarly priced 
units.  
Why are states channeling so many LIHTC developments into areas where 
there is already a surplus of housing units affordable at the same price point? In 
order to answer this question, it is necessary to understand the legal apparatus 
that facilitates the distribution of tax credits.  
II.  STATE ALLOCATION RULES ANALYSIS 
A. FEDERAL FRAMEWORK & THE STATE QAP 
Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code sets forth the rules of the LIHTC 
program. Congress designed the program in a Reagan era dedicated to 
“devolution” and decentralizing traditional federal government functions to 
provide states and localities with greater flexibility to experiment. As a result, 
the federal law governing the LIHTC program provides a relatively bare bones 
structure, with the expectation that the states would flesh out the rules in the 
manner best suited to varying regional considerations.  
The LIHTC authorizing statute requires that all fifty states enact a qualified 
allocation plan (QAP) “which sets forth selection criteria to be used to determine 
housing priorities of the housing credit agency which are appropriate to local 
conditions.”50 The statute provides a basic list of ten factors that states must 
incorporate into the project selection criteria: (i) project location, (ii) housing 
needs characteristics, (iii) project characteristics,51 (iv) sponsor characteristics, 
(v) tenant populations with special housing needs, (vi) public housing waiting 
lists, (vii) tenant populations of individuals with children, (viii) projects intended 
for eventual tenant ownership, (ix) the energy efficiency of the project, and (x) 
the historic nature of the project.52 Scholars have noted that despite listing these 
factors, the statute provides no direction regarding how they should be 
incorporated into the selection criteria.53 
In addition to these ten criteria, states must allocate at least 10% of the tax 
credits to projects involving nonprofit developers.54 Essentially the only other 
guidance given to states regarding allocation priorities is that they are to give 
scoring preferences to projects that (a) serve the lowest-income tenants, (b) serve 
 
 50. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
 51. The only elaboration the law gives with respect to what is meant by “project characteristics” is to say, 
“including whether the project includes the use of existing housing as part of a community revitalization 
plan . . . .” Id. § 42(m)(1)(C)(iii). 
 52. Id. § 42(m)(1)(C)(i)–(x). 
 53. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 11, at 1018 (“However, as GAO has noted, while ‘the Code specifically 
directs the agencies to include [originally] seven “selection criteria” in their allocation plans[,] the Code does 
not define these criteria or provide any guidance for their use.’ For example, the Code requires that each QAP’s 
selection criteria include ‘project location’ and ‘tenant populations with special housing needs,’ but does not tell 
an allocating agency what to do about these subjects. Moreover, the Treasury’s regulations provide no further 
guidance on these standards.” (second alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).  
 54. I.R.C. § 42(h)(5). 
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qualified tenants for the longest periods of time, and (c) are located in certain 
high poverty “qualified census tracts . . . and the development of which 
contributes to a concerted community revitalization plan.”55 Beyond those 
relatively minimal instructions, states are by and large permitted to award 
LIHTCs as they see fit. Furthermore, nothing in the law provides states with any 
guidance regarding how to prioritize these various factors and preferences.  
Notably absent from the list of federal QAP requirements is anything that 
specifically references the degree to which the restricted rents of a proposed 
LIHTC project are below local area market rents. As noted above, the federal 
rules do require developers to submit a market study of the “housing needs of 
low-income individuals in the area to be served by the project.”56 Presumably, 
Congress intended this market study mechanism to ensure that the program 
delivered additional affordability. However, the federal statute fails to provide 
any additional guidance regarding the contents of the required market study; nor 
does federal law require that the results of the market study be incorporated into 
the actual scoring criteria employed by the state.  
As a result of this discretion afforded to states, QAPs exhibit significant 
variance in their allocation priorities, particularly with respect to their market 
study requirements. HUD has noted this fact and observed that it comes with 
certain costs.57 However, to date, the nature of this variance has not been 
systematically studied. 
B. FOUR VARYING STATE APPROACHES 
In order to home in specifically on the legal apparatus that gives rise to the 
misallocation problem, between January and April 2017 I obtained the current 
QAP for each of the fifty states.58 Some QAPs contain the market study 
requirements within the body of the QAP itself, while other states include them 
 
 55. Id. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii). The LIHTC statute defines a “qualified census tract” as “any census tract . . . in 
which 50 percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 60 percent of the area median 
gross income for such year or which has a poverty rate of at least 25 percent.” Id. § 42(d)(5)(B)(ii)(I). See infra 
Subpart IV.B for further discussion of this provision.  
 56. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(A)(iii). 
 57. See DAVID B. WILDERMAN, OFFICE OF MULTIFAMILY HOUS. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., MARKET STUDY STANDARDS 1–2 (2011), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ 
market_study_standards_alignment_072711.pdf (“While some excellent model practice standards exist for 
market studies, there is no national standard of practice for market studies comparable to Uniform Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP) for appraisals and no broadly acknowledged ‘keeper’ of such standards 
comparable to the Appraisal Foundation, which promulgates and periodically amends USPAP. . . . Among 
states, practice varies widely, with some States prescribing sound but unique methodologies, while others have 
only loosely defined standards . . . . The effects of disparate market study practice and quality can be both specific 
and cumulative. Specific effects include confusion, loss of time and extra expense for developers and owners 
who pay for market studies that may add little value to the quality of real estate decision making.”).  
 58. For purposes of comparison at the U.S. state level, the QAPs for the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Washington, D.C. were not included in this analysis. All studied QAPs are on file 
with the Author.  
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in separate documents. For states that fall into the latter category, I also obtained 
the separate market study documents during the same period.  
As expected, the market study requirements vary widely. This is 
particularly true with respect to the way in which states integrate a comparison 
of local area market rents versus proposed LIHTC restricted rents into their 
requirements. Almost every state requires that developers seeking an award of 
tax credits conduct a market analysis that in some way considers the rents of 
housing already existing in the local area. The states vary dramatically, however, 
with respect to how they use the results of this analysis.  
More specifically, each of the fifty states falls into one of four categories 
that I describe herein as follows: (1) rent differential as threshold requirement, 
(2) rent differential as incentive, (3) clear reference with no instrumental 
relationship, and (4) no clear reference to rent differential. These four categories 
are further described below.  
1. Rent Differential as Threshold Requirement 
States in this category make it an explicit threshold requirement that in 
order to receive a LIHTC award, the proposed project must have rents that are 
lower than the rents of comparable unsubsidized properties in the local market 
area. Nine states fall into this category.59  
Alabama is an example of a state in this category. The state’s QAP requires 
a market study that “must demonstrate that there is a rent advantage over non-
subsidized housing in the defined market area.”60 Similarly, Idaho requires that 
the “maximum tax credit rents . . . must be less than the market rents for 
comparable units in the area where the development is to be located.”61 The 
imperative nature of the language means that proposed projects receive an 
allocation of tax credits only if there is a demonstrated rent differential between 
market rents and the LIHTC restricted rents.  
Some states in this category go further and, not only require a showing of 
any rent differential, but actually specify a certain magnitude of differential that 
 
 59. The states are: Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, New Jersey, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin. For a general review of the QAPs of these states, see Affordable Housing Resource Center: 2017 
QAPs and Applications, NOVOGRADAC & COMPANY LLP, https://www.novoco.com/resource-
centers/affordable-housing-tax-credits/application-allocation/qaps-and-applications/2017-qaps-and-
applications (last visited Nov. 21, 2018). 
 60. ALA. HOUS. FIN. AUTH., 2017 HOUSING CREDIT QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 8 (2016), 
https://www.ahfa.com/Content/Uploads/ahfa.com/files/MF%20Allocation/2017%20docs/2017%20Housing%2
0Credit%20QAP%20Addendums_govapproved.pdf (emphasis added). 
 61. IDAHO HOUS. & FIN. ASS’N, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM QUALIFIED ALLOCATION 
PLAN FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO 69 (2018), https://www.idahohousing.com/documents/qap-approved-february-
20-2018.pdf (emphasis added). 
J - WEISS_24 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:29 AM 
228 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:215 
must be demonstrated. For example, California,62 Georgia,63 Iowa,64 New 
Jersey,65 and South Carolina66 all require a 10% differential between area market 
rents and proposed LIHTC rents. In other words, to receive an allocation of tax 
credits, a developer must show that the rents of a proposed project will be at 
least 10% below local area market rents. 
2. Rent Differential as Incentive 
States in this category do not go so far as making a showing of a rent 
differential a requirement of receiving an award of tax credits. However, these 
states directly link the showing of a rent differential to the final score assigned 
to a proposed project. They do this by awarding a discrete number of points to 
projects capable of demonstrating that such a differential exists. While not a 
strict prerequisite for LIHTC funding, these states nonetheless clearly 
incentivize the production of housing where LIHTC rents are below area market 
rents. Only three states—Michigan,67 Montana,68 and Wyoming69—fall into this 
category. 
 
 62. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 10325(f)(1)(B) (2018) (“The proposed tenant paid rents for each affordable 
unit type in the proposed development will be at least ten percent (10%) below the weighted average rent for the 
same unit types in comparable market rate rental properties . . . .”).  
 63. GA. DEP’T. OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, 2017 STATE OF GEORGIA QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN app. 1, at 15 
(2017), https://dca.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2017_qualified_allocation_plan.pdf (“The minimum rent 
differential between the proposed rents and average market rents (as explained in the Market Study Manual) 
must be 10%.”). 
 64. IOWA FIN. AUTH., IOWA FINANCE AUTHORITY LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 2017 9% 
QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 6 (2017), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ 
iowa_2017_final_qap_030117.pdf (“The market study provider will be instructed to assume all LIHTC Units 
have a minimum ten percent (10%) market advantage for each bedroom size when evaluating comparable market 
rate (free market) Units in a primary market area. If the Applicant applies with proposed rents that exceed this 
level, the Applicant shall be required to adjust rents in the deficiency period.”). 
 65. N.J. HOUS. & MORTG. FIN. AGENCY, LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT ALLOCATION PLAN 28 
(2017), http://www.nj.gov/dca/hmfa/media/download/tax/qap/tc_qap.pdf (“The proposed rent shall have at least 
a 10 percent rent advantage in relation to the estimate of market rent.”). 
 66. S.C. STATE HOUS. FIN. & DEV. AUTH., LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 2017 AND 2018 
QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 8 (2016), http://www.schousing.com/library/Tax%20Credit/2017/FinalQAP.pdf 
(“Market Advantage: All developments must have an overall minimum market advantage of 10% to be 
considered for funding.”). 
 67. MICH. STATE HOUS. DEV. AUTH., 2017–2018 LIHTC SCORING CRITERIA (2017), 
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/michigan_2017-2018_scoring_summary_081616.pdf 
(“All projects in locations where the average rents of comparable market-rate rental units, based on the Primary 
Market Area and the comparables described in the project market study, exceed the affordable 60% AMI rent 
limit by 20% or more will be eligible for 5 points.”). 
 68. MONT. BD. OF HOUS., HOUSING CREDIT PROGRAM: 2017 QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN (QAP) 37 
(2017), http://housing.mt.gov/Portals/93/shared/docs/MultifamilyDevelopment/QAP/2017QAP.pdf. 
 69. WYO. CMTY. DEV. AUTH., 2016 AFFORDABLE HOUSING ALLOCATION PLAN (HOME, TAX CREDIT & 
TAX-EXEMPT PROGRAMS) 18 (2016), http://www.wyomingcda.com/documents/2016_FINAL_QAP.pdf (“Up to 
a negative 100 points may be assessed if the [sic] any of the proposed rents or the weighted average of the 
proposed rents are above market rate rents for the area.”). Note that similar language does not appear in the 2017 
Wyoming QAP. WYO. CMTY. DEV. AUTH., 2017 AFFORDABLE HOUSING ALLOCATION PLAN (HOME, NHTF, 
TAX CREDIT & TAX-EXEMPT PROGRAMS) 26 (2017), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/ 
files/atoms/files/wyoming_17.pdf. 
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Montana’s 2017 QAP provides a clear example: 
The application will be awarded points based upon the required Market Study’s 
documentation that the Project meets the market needs of the community, as 
follows . . . Rents are at least 10% below adjusted market rents (20 points).70  
First, the provision invites applicants to demonstrate that the rents of a 
proposed LIHTC project will be lower—in this case, by 10%—than area market 
rents. Second, the QAP directly links this showing to the final score assigned to 
the proposed project—in this case, by increasing the proposed project’s final 
score by 20 points. Thus, while not as determinative as the QAP provisions in 
the threshold requirement category, these QAP standards do help ensure that 
LIHTC units only are developed in areas where there is not already a surplus of 
similarly priced units.  
3. Clear Reference with No Instrumental Relationship 
The third category—by far the largest—is like the first two in that state 
QAPs in this category contain a clear reference to analyzing the rents of 
comparable buildings in the market area. However, unlike the first two 
categories, QAPs in this category do not make showing a rent differential a 
threshold requirement of obtaining an award of tax credits, nor do they award a 
discrete number of points to projects that show such a rent differential exists. 
Rather, they leave unspecified the impact that this comparison has on whether 
or not a project ultimately receives an award of tax credits. Thirty-six states fall 
into this category.71 
For example, in Rhode Island, “additional consideration will be given to 
projects that demonstrate that the proposed tax credit rents are below those of 
comparable, unassisted units in the market.”72 While the state is clearly attuned 
to the rent differential issue, the language used in its QAP is entirely aspirational. 
Developers are not required to show that a rent advantage exists, nor are they 
awarded any discrete points for making such a showing. Rather, the QAP 
broadly gives “additional consideration” to projects where such a rent 
differential exists, without instrumentalizing this concept in any way.  
Many other states require some comparison of market rents with proposed 
LIHTC unit rents, but do not even explicitly provide that any “additional 
 
 70. MONT. BD. OF HOUS., supra note 68, at 37. 
 71. The states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. For a general review 
of the QAPs of these states, see Affordable Housing Resource Center: 2017 QAPs and Applications, supra note 
59. 
 72. R.I. HOUS., STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 2017–2018 QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE LOW-INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 25 (2017), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/ 
files/rhode_island_2017-2018_final_qap_2017.pdf (“Developers are encouraged to set rents so that the 
proposed rents are affordable to residents in a given location and not simply set at the program’s maximum 
rents.” (emphasis added)). 
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consideration” will be given to below-market projects. Indiana requires 
developers seeking a LIHTC award to “[d]erive a market rent and compare it to 
the applicant’s proposed rent in the form of market advantage.”73 Maryland 
requires developers to “[d]erive a market rent and an achievable rent and then 
compare them to the proposed rent.”74 Illinois requires developers to “[p]rovide 
a comparison summary of the proposed development and the competing market-
area rental developments.”75 Kentucky requires developers to “[c]ompare the 
analyst-determined market rent and the proposed rent for each bedroom type. 
Discuss how proposed rents compare to market rents.”76 None of these QAPs, 
however, links this comparison to a threshold requirement or to a discrete 
scoring incentive. It thus falls to the LIHTC allocating agency’s ad hoc 
discretion to determine how much, if at all, to consider the rent differential issue 
in making its LIHTC awards.  
4. No Clear Reference to Rent Differential  
Unlike those of the prior three categories, the market study requirements 
of states that fall into this final category make no clear reference to showing a 
rent differential between market rents and proposed LIHTC rents. In accordance 
with the federal LIHTC statute, they do reference some analysis of market 
characteristics.77 However, these requirements are often left broad and 
unspecified, in no way directly referencing the notion of whether there is an 
actual difference between area market rents and the proposed LIHTC-restricted 
rents. Only New Hampshire78 and New Mexico79 fall into this category.  
New Hampshire’s QAP states:  
Potential market demand must be proven, and the proposed project must not 
negatively affect an existing publicly-assisted affordable rental property. All 
applicants applying for LIHTC are required to submit a market study at the time 
of application prepared by a disinterested party (i.e. someone who does not have 
 
 73. IND. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. AUTH., STATE OF INDIANA 2016–2017 QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN, 
SCHEDULE C MARKET STUDY REQUIREMENTS 10 (2016) (on file with author). 
 74. MD. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., MULTIFAMILY RENTAL FINANCING PROGRAM GUIDE, 
ATTACHMENT TO MARYLAND QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL LOW INCOME 
HOUSING TAX CREDITS 34 (2016), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/ 
files/maryland_2016_final_multifamily_rental_financing_guide_submitted_to_gov_080116.pdf. 
 75. ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH., STANDARDS FOR SITE AND MARKET STUDIES 2016–2017 QAP 10, 
https://www.ihda.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/SPARLink9-2016-2017SiteandMarketStandards-2.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2018). 
 76. KY. HOUS. CORP., MARKET STUDY REQUIREMENTS 10, http://www.kyhousing.org/Development/ 
Multifamily/Documents/MarketStudyRequirements.pdf (last revised June 2017).  
 77. See I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(A)(iii) (2012). 
 78. N.H. HOUS., NEW HAMPSHIRE 2017 QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE LOW INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 4–9 (2016), https://www.nhhfa.org/assets/pdf/2017QAP_052516_Final.pdf. 
 79. N.M. MORTG. FIN. AUTH., STATE OF NEW MEXICO HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM QUALIFIED 
ALLOCATION PLAN 39 (2017), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ 
new_mexico_2017_final_qap_121216.pdf. 
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any interest in the development or have a relationship with the owner of the 
development) approved by the Authority.80  
Developers in New Hampshire thus must prove “demand” for the proposed 
LIHTC housing; demand, however, is not further specified. Does it incorporate 
an analysis of the available subsidized and unsubsidized housing stock already 
available in the area? Some measure of how the combination of current supply 
and demand yield current market rents and how those market rents compare with 
the proposed LIHTC rents? Or could a developer demonstrate demand simply 
by showing that a certain number of low-income households reside in the area 
without looking at all to the existing supply side of the equation? The New 
Hampshire QAP does not answer these questions.  
Going one step further, New Mexico’s QAP states that if a proposed tax 
credit project passes a certain threshold review and is a top scoring project, or if 
the housing finance agency otherwise deems it warranted, then the housing 
finance agency “may commission a standardized market study by outside 
professionals chosen pursuant to the requirements of [the housing agency’s] 
procurement policy and having no financial interest in any of the Projects.”81 
New Mexico’s QAP thus does not even make the provision of a market study an 
absolute prerequisite of receiving an award of tax credits.  
  
 
 80. N.H. HOUS., supra note 78, at 4. 
 81. N.M. MORTG. FIN. AUTH., supra note 79, at 39 (emphasis added). 
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C. MODEL STANDARDS AND THE SUPREMACY OF FINANCIAL VIABILITY  
Clearly the largest cluster of states is in the third category. These are the 
states that require some consideration of comparable market rents to LIHTC 
proposed rents, but fail to directly link a showing of an explicit rent differential 
to a threshold requirement or to a specific scoring regime.  
Given that so many states fall into this third category, it is worth closely 
exploring the standards used by these housing finance agencies. In 2013, the 
National Council of Housing Market Analysts (NCHMA) issued the Model 
Content Standards for Rental Housing Market Studies (“Model Standards”).82 
While the majority of state housing finance agencies have not explicitly adopted 
these standards, a number of states in the third category have integrated them 
into their market study requirements and many more have standards that employ 
 
 82. NAT’L COUNCIL OF HOUS. MKT. ANALYSTS, MODEL CONTENT STANDARDS FOR RENTAL HOUSING 
MARKET STUDIES (2013), https://www.housingonline.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Final-Model-Content-
V3.0.pdf [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS].  
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similar methodologies.83 The Model Standards thus serve as a helpful example 
of the sort of analysis employed by many of the states that fall in the third 
category.  
Rather than focusing on establishing a rent advantage as the primary goal, 
the Model Standards instead take an underwriting approach to the market study. 
In other words, the primary goal is to determine whether a certain proposed 
LIHTC project will be financially feasible.84 Market analysts are instructed to 
analyze a wide variety of factors in the “primary market area” in order to make 
this determination, including: basic characteristics of the proposed project 
(number of units, bedroom mix, proposed rents, income restrictions, project 
amenities, construction costs), location, employment and local economy, area 
demographics (population and household counts and characteristics, income 
distribution, analysis of trends, information on household rent burdens and 
substandard housing conditions), competitive environment (existing housing 
stock overview, recent construction activity, planned units in the pipeline, 
vacancy rates, absorption rates, identification of comparable unsubsidized and 
subsidized properties and comparison of rents, amenities, and features).85 
Analysts are further instructed to employ a number of metrics based on these 
factors to determine whether sufficient demand exists in the area for the 
proposed LIHTC development.86 
As one component of the process, market analysts are instructed to 
“[d]erive a market rent and an achievable restricted rent and then compare them 
to the developer’s proposed rent” and to “[q]uantify and discuss [the] market 
advantage of the subject [property] and [its] impact on marketability.”87 Thus, 
the Model Standards clearly require analysis of the rent differential issue. 
However, nowhere do the Model Standards indicate that market analysts must 
establish the existence of a rent advantage of the proposed LIHTC project over 
unsubsidized units in the area. Rather, NCHMA explicitly has endorsed the 
contrary view. The group acknowledges that a number of state allocating 
agencies do require that “income-restricted projects,” such as LIHTC projects, 
 
 83. Among states in the third category, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, North 
Dakota, Ohio, and Virginia all either rely exclusively on the Model Standards for their market study 
requirements, or use the Model Standards in conjunction with other state-specific supplementary requirements. 
 84. In December 2017, the National Council of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA) released a set of 
recommended practices in LIHTC administration. NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE HOUS. AGENCIES, NCSHA 
RECOMMENDED PRACTICES IN HOUSING CREDIT ADMINISTRATION (2017), https://www.ncsha.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/NCSHA-Recommended-Practices-in-Housing-Credit-Administration-Updated-Dec-
2017.pdf. Under its recommendations related to market studies, NCHSA similarly focused on financial 
feasibility without referencing anything related to establishing a below-market rent advantage. See id. at 11. 
(“Allocating Agencies (or contracted third-parties) should review each study to determine its implications for 
the financial viability of the property and whether it justifies the need for the number, size, and type (such as 
family, elderly, or other special needs housing) of rental housing proposed.” (emphasis added)).  
 85. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 82. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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should have below-market rents, often set to 10% below market.88 However, the 
group states that in some cases such market rent advantage “may not be 
necessary,” and gives a list of examples where this may be true.89  
When NCHMA uses the term “necessary,” it means necessary to ensure 
the financial viability of the proposed LIHTC project. This is not the same thing 
as being necessary to ensure the goals of the LIHTC program. Being financially 
viable means, among other things, that once completed, the proposed LIHTC 
project will be attractive to a critical mass of income-eligible households such 
that the new development will be leased up and will generate sufficient operating 
income to cover expenses. One might ask, isn’t the fact that a new LIHTC 
building leases up with income-eligible residents paying restricted rents 
evidence enough that the program is working, even if the LIHTC rents are no 
different than the rents offered by comparable unsubsidized properties? Why 
might such a LIHTC project that attracts enough income-eligible households not 
be sufficiently furthering the goals of the program?  
III.  NEIGHBORHOOD SCENARIO ANALYSIS 
One can imagine at least the following two scenarios in which LIHTC 
developments, offered at or near market rents, might attract sufficient income-
eligible households so as to be financially feasible, while not necessarily 
furthering the purposes of the program. In each scenario, it is possible that 
program goals are well served, but current QAP allocation rules do not guarantee 
it. 
A. SCENARIO 1: “CROWDING-OUT” MARKET RATE HOUSING 
A first scenario is one in which LIHTC units simply displace units that the 
private market would otherwise produce. There is in fact empirical evidence 
supporting the notion that this occurs to some degree. Using a regression 
analysis, Nathaniel Baum-Snow and Justin Marion found that for every newly-
constructed LIHTC unit, the number of recently constructed rental units within 
 
 88. See Susan Burnett, Calculating Market Rent, NAT’L HOUSING & REHABILITATION ASS’N (Jan. 2006), 
https://www.housingonline.com/councils/national-council-housing-market-analysts/resources/white-
papers/calculating-market-rent/ (“A growing number of users of market studies for income-restricted projects 
require market analysts to determine whether a planned project’s proposed income restricted rents are 
sufficiently below market rents for a comparable unit. In the consideration of an income restricted project, many 
investors, lenders, and state allocating agencies think that the units should have below-market rents to 
compensate for their limited pool of potential tenants. The below market rents are expected to assure that the 
units can compete effectively for tenants with market rate units. Typically, lenders and investors indicate that a 
proposed project should have rents that are at least 10% below the rents the project could attain on the free 
market.”).  
 89. Id. (“Examples may include (1) a rehabilitation project that, in comparison to competing projects, will 
be similar in age, design, amenities, and tenant profile; (2) a new project with better amenities than any other in 
the primary market area, and (3) a market when there is limited supply and the restricted rates, although close to 
market, are affordable to the target tenant.”). 
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one kilometer of the project location increased by only 0.8 units.90 In other 
words, the development of each new LIHTC unit yields only 0.8 of a unit of net 
gain. Other research into the displacement effects of LIHTC properties have 
found some evidence of even stronger crowd-out effects,91 although in some 
cases they found that the primary impact of this effect was to push market rate 
development to other areas rather than displace it altogether.92 
Simply displacing housing that otherwise would have been built by the 
private market certainly is not one of the legislative purposes of the LIHTC 
program. Yet the underwriting approach employed by the majority of state QAPs 
would facilitate this outcome. By focusing on financial feasibility, while 
neglecting also to require below-market rents, state housing finance agencies 
may be ensuring that LIHTC projects are financially viable—of course an 
important component of what federal subsidized housing policies should do—
but without also ensuring that a net increase in affordability is also obtained. 
However, in a gentrifying neighborhood,93 substituting market-rate 
housing with rent-restricted LIHTC housing may in fact be serving the goals of 
the program, even if the rent-restricted units would be no less expensive than the 
market-rate units. In a gentrifying neighborhood, rents are expected to rise in the 
near future. Developing rent-restricted housing, even if not below market today, 
may deliver below-market rents in the future once area rents have increased. 
Thus, development of non-below-market LIHTC housing in gentrifying 
 
 90. Nathaniel Baum-Snow & Justin Marion, The Effects of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments 
on Neighborhoods, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 654, 655 (2009). 
 91. Stephen Malpezzi & Kerry Vandell, Does the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Increase the Supply of 
Housing?, 11 J. HOUSING ECON. 360, 360 (2002) (“[W]e find no significant relationship between the number of 
LIHTC units (and other subsidized units) built in a given state and the size of the current housing stock, 
suggesting a high rate of substitution,” though the authors noted certain limits to the regression model used).  
 92. Michael D. Eriksen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Crowd Out Effects of Place-Based Subsidized Rental 
Housing: New Evidence from the LIHTC Program, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 953, 953 (2010) (“[N]early 100% of LIHTC 
development is offset by a reduction in the number of newly built unsubsidized rental units, although the 
confidence band around this point estimate allows for less dramatic assessments. Additional estimates suggest 
that LIHTC development has a much more moderate impact on construction of owner-occupied housing, but 
these estimates are imprecise. Overall, while LIHTC development may well affect the location of low-moderate 
income rental housing opportunities, our estimates suggest that the impact of the program on the number of 
newly developed rental housing units appears to be small.”). 
 93. For one of the earlier definitions of gentrification, see Peter Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, 
and Displacement: Connections, Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 195, 198–99 (1985) (“Gentrification occurs when new residents—who disproportionately are 
young, white, professional, technical, and managerial workers with higher education and income levels—replace 
older residents—who disproportionately are low-income, working-class and poor, minority and ethnic group 
members, and elderly—from older and previously deteriorated inner-city housing in a spatially concentrated 
manner, that is, to a degree differing substantially from the general level of change in the community or region 
as a whole. The definition hinges on economic, social, and population changes that cause physical changes to 
the neighborhoods. The physical changes, however, are not the essence of the process. Furthermore, the 
definition distinguishes changes that may occur nationally, or on a city-wide or regional basis, from those 
situations where changes in certain neighborhoods are different from changes in other neighborhoods.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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neighborhoods could serve the long-term purposes of the LIHTC program by 
preserving affordability in the event of future market escalation.  
Baum-Snow and Marion found the crowd-out effect to be particularly 
pronounced in gentrifying neighborhoods, where each new LIHTC unit yielded 
only a 0.37 gain in total recently constructed rental units.94 They conclude that 
there “appears to be significant crowd-out of private construction” in gentrifying 
areas, as “the private market would have created more than 60% of the LIHTC 
new construction in gentrifying areas if the program did not exist.”95 If housing 
finance agencies engaged in this affordability preservation strategy deliberately, 
one could imagine a justification for allocating some LIHTCs to projects in 
gentrifying neighborhoods even where presently they would not be below 
market.  
B. SCENARIO 2: UPGRADING HOUSING QUALITY 
Another reason why a LIHTC project, offered at or near market rates, might 
attract enough income-eligible households so as to be financially feasible, 
without necessarily maximizing the goals of the program, relates to housing 
quality. One can imagine a scenario in which income-eligible residents of a 
neighborhood move from their current housing to a new LIHTC project, not 
because the new housing offers any additional affordability, but rather because 
it offers superior amenities. This is in fact one of the scenarios envisioned by 
NCHMA when arguing that a rent advantage is not always necessary to warrant 
LIHTC development—i.e., where a newly constructed LIHTC project offers 
“better amenities than any other in the primary market area.”96  
Improving housing quality is an extremely important feature of subsidized 
housing programs. While it is not commonly thought of as the primary purpose 
of the LIHTC program,97 upgrading the quality of the housing stock nonetheless 
is a laudable goal. Housing is a consumable good, and as it ages it must be 
replaced. The issue of affordability thus is inherently linked to the issue of 
housing quality—as supply deteriorates over time, upward pressure is exerted 
on the rents of the remaining stock. 
However, given the housing quality standards of the LIHTC program, any 
new unit that is developed, wherever located, will be of good quality.98 A 
random geographic allocation of LIHTCs would improve housing quality 
options for low-income households. The question is not whether or not the 
program will improve housing quality options for low-income residents. The 
 
 94. Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 90, at 655. 
 95. Id. at 655, 665. 
 96. Burnett, supra note 88. 
 97. See Williamson, supra note 13, at 777 (“While the provision of better-quality housing and housing 
located in low-poverty areas are also important U.S. housing policy goals, the issue of housing affordability is 
arguably the strongest reason for public intervention in private housing markets in recent decades.”). 
 98. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-5 (2018) (describing the regular physical inspections of LIHTC projects required 
to be conducted by housing finance agencies). 
J - WEISS_24 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:29 AM 
December 2018] LOCATING AFFORDABLE HOUSING 237 
question is where to locate the high quality housing generated by the program. 
Presumably, the answer is that it should be located where it does the most to 
further the other goals of the allocating agency—be they, for example, 
increasing access to “communities of opportunity”99 or revitalizing declining 
neighborhoods. Yet, the fact that the housing is occupied and financially viable 
tells us nothing with respect to how well the program is meeting other agency 
goals.  
The development of a LIHTC project that is of high quality certainly can 
help spur broader neighborhood revitalization efforts. Indeed, as discussed at 
greater length in Subpart IV.B, the federal LIHTC statute actually contains a 
preference for certain projects that “contribute[] to a concerted community 
revitalization plan.”100 Subsidized housing developments deliver far more than 
just quality shelter to individual households; they also can have a number of 
positive spillover effects in a community. For example, LIHTC projects have 
been found to increase property values in declining neighborhoods.101 Thus, if 
an agency deploys credits as part of a broader revitalization plan, there may be 
an argument that the allocation is warranted even if not offering below-market 
rents. 
C. THE INADEQUACY OF FINANCIAL VIABILITY TO GUARANTEE 
PROGRAMMATIC SUCCESS 
The above scenarios demonstrate that the mere conclusion that a project is 
financially feasible does not guarantee that the project is well serving the goals 
of the LIHTC program. In Scenario 1 (Market Crowd Out), feasibility stems 
from the fact that there is sufficient demand for housing at a price that the private 
market would deliver on its own without the deployment of scarce housing 
subsidy resources. In such cases, the LIHTC program is not increasing 
affordability beyond what would be offered by the private market. In Scenario 2 
(Housing Quality Upgrade), project feasibility results from the fact that the 
LIHTC program has improved the quality of housing options available to low-
income households—clearly a desired outcome—but one that would be attained 
regardless of where the housing is located. Feasibility does not ensure that the 
locational decisions of the allocating agency maximize the other goals of the 
program.  
At the same time, these scenarios also demonstrate that in some cases, there 
may be a strong rationale for building LIHTC projects even when they do not 
offer below-market rents. In a gentrifying neighborhood, LIHTC financing can 
serve as a mechanism to preserve affordability in the face of anticipated future 
market rent hikes. In declining neighborhoods, LIHTC projects can serve as an 
important stimulus tool when contributing to a concerted revitalization effort.  
 
 99. See Chetty et al., supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 100. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III) (2012). 
 101. See Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 90, at 663. 
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Yet unfortunately current LIHTC allocating practices permit the allocation 
of credits to projects that neither deliver below-market rents, nor serve these 
other policy goals. Market study requirements that focus primarily on whether a 
building will be financially viable do not disaggregate these scenarios, or any 
other scenarios in which tenants may choose to occupy a new LIHTC project. 
This point is a critical step in understanding what I have described above as the 
“misallocation problem.” A central reason why housing finance agencies award 
scarce tax credits disproportionately to projects located in census tracts where 
there is already a surplus of units at similar rent levels is because the QAPs and 
market study requirements do not make provision of below-market rents a 
priority. Nor do they effectively prioritize other programmatic goals. Rather, 
they place primary importance on ensuring that a project will be financially 
viable. These concepts are not equivalent. As a result, as discussed below in Part 
IV, locational outcomes are by default left to the discretion of private developers 
often motivated to develop where land is cheapest.  
IV.  OBSTACLES TO ADDRESSING THE MISALLOCATION PROBLEM 
This Article began with a simple question: why would states 
overwhelmingly direct scarce housing production incentives to areas where 
there is already a surplus of housing available at similar rent levels? Below, I 
consider four obstacles a state might encounter in trying to address this 
misallocation problem related to: 1) lack of agency autonomy, 2) federal 
framework limitations, 3) land costs, and 4) local political opposition.  
A. LACK OF AGENCY AUTONOMY 
The LIHTC program is a federally allocated tax credit administered by the 
fifty states. Yet, as described above, in many ways the program actually is 
implemented in a diffuse manner by the decisions of thousands of private real 
estate developers. Private developers, after all, are the parties who conceive of a 
project, draw up the plans, organize the necessary layers of financing and, most 
critically, select the site on which a project will be built. The state housing 
finance agency (HFA), it could be argued, plays somewhat of a passive role. The 
agency receives an application for tax credits, evaluates the proposal, and awards 
the incentives to the top scoring projects. Thus, a state HFA lacks the autonomy 
to directly dictate where projects are located.  
This sort of argument proved persuasive to the district court in the Inclusive 
Communities case referenced in the Introduction.102 As noted above, the 
plaintiffs in that case argued that the Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs had violated the federal Fair Housing Act by 
disproportionately awarding LIHTCs to developments located in majority 
nonwhite neighborhoods, thus furthering residential racial segregation in the 
area. The United States Supreme Court upheld the disparate impact theory of 
 
 102. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
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liability under the FHA in general, but remanded the case to the district court to 
determine whether the plaintiffs had proven their disparate impact claim in this 
particular instance. Justice Kennedy’s opinion emphasized the importance of 
establishing “robust” causality between the challenged policy or practice and the 
alleged disparate impact.103 On remand, the district court dismissed the case for, 
among other reasons, failure by the plaintiffs to establish the requisite causality. 
The court stated that the plaintiffs had failed to show that “local zoning rules, 
community preferences, or developers’ choices did not contribute to the 
statistical disparity.”104 In other words, you cannot blame the housing 
department for locational outcomes that, at least in part, were caused by the 
decisions of private developers.  
While it is no doubt true that states may not directly dictate the location of 
LIHTC developments, they can play a heavily influential role. States have 
significant leverage in the ability to determine the priorities set forth in the 
qualified allocation plans (QAPs) used to score proposed LIHTC developments. 
Some research has shown that developer choices are sensitive to QAP 
incentives.105 Given the QAP analysis contained herein, however, it appears that 
states are not effectively using this leverage to influence the locational choices 
of developers. Nothing would prevent all fifty states from following the lead of 
the nine states in the “Rent Differential as Threshold Requirement” category 
described above,106 and requiring that projects be located in neighborhoods 
where there is an established rent advantage—commonly ten percent—of the 
LIHTC project as compared to area market rents.107 Alternatively, nothing 
would prevent a state from following the lead of the three states in the “Rent 
Differential as Incentive” category described above,108 and providing an explicit 
scoring boost to any project that demonstrates a substantial rent advantage. 
Despite the fact that state housing agencies do not on a project-by-project basis 
determine where a development is located, they could steer these outcomes 
 
 103. Id. at 2523–24. 
 104. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 WL 
4494322, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016) (emphasis added).  
 105. See infra notes 113–114, 121 and accompanying text; see also Ingrid Gould Ellen & Keren Mertens 
Horn, Points for Place: Can State Governments Shape Siting Patterns of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
Developments, 28 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 727, 740 (2018) (“[W]e think our results suggest that allocation plans 
matter. We find statistically significant relationships between changes in state allocation plans and the locations 
of privately owned housing developments allocated tax credits, despite our small sample size. In general, states 
that increased the priority given to developments in higher opportunity areas in their allocation plans saw 
increases in the share of tax credits allocated for projects in low-poverty areas and decreases in the share of tax 
credits allocated for projects in largely minority areas.”).  
 106. See supra Subpart II.B.1.  
 107. Additional research has shown that QAPs fail to use their leverage in other ways that might be 
beneficial with respect to locational outcomes. For example, one study of thirty-six QAPs found that only twelve 
of them contained any preference for locating in “high-opportunity” neighborhoods. JILL KHADDURI, POVERTY 
& RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, CREATING BALANCE IN THE LOCATIONS OF LIHTC DEVELOPMENTS: THE 
ROLE OF QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLANS 15 (2013). 
 108. See supra Subpart II.B.2. 
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much more effectively by increasing strategic location-related incentives to 
influence the decisions of private developers.  
B. FEDERAL FRAMEWORK LIMITATIONS 
Another potential challenge to addressing the misallocation problem relates 
to the federal LIHTC statute.109 As mentioned above, among the few directions 
the statute provides related to state QAPs is the requirement that states give 
preference to projects that are located in “qualified census tracts . . . and the 
development of which contributes to a concerted community revitalization 
plan.”110 A qualified census tract (QCT) is defined as “any census tract . . . in 
which 50 percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 
60 percent of the area median gross income for such year or which has a poverty 
rate of at least 25 percent.”111 There is no legislative history with respect to the 
original QCT feature of the LIHTC statute, nor has recent HUD guidance on the 
mechanics of the QCT requirement expressed any policy objectives.112 The 
LIHTC statute provides a significant positive multiplier in the calculation used 
to determine how many tax credits projects located in QCTs are awarded.113 
Thus, the federal rules inherently incentivize the development of LIHTC 
projects in neighborhoods where incomes are below the area median. Assuming 
typical market dynamics, these neighborhoods are likely to be those where rents 
are similarly below area median rents. As a result, it might be argued that the 
federal framework contains structural features that promote LIHTC 
development in those neighborhoods where they are least needed: namely, those 
where LIHTC restricted rent levels are likely to be comparable to market rents.  
Research shows, however, that the effect of the federal QCT rules may be 
modest with regards to agency decisions concerning the allocation of tax credits. 
McClure finds that only about a third of LIHTC projects are developed in 
QCTs.114 Baum-Snow and Marion find that census tracts just above the 
minimum requirements to qualify as a QCT do receive significantly more 
LIHTC units than those census tracts which fall just short of the minimum 
requirements.115 However, the “response of LIHTC units to QCT status seems 
driven by developers’ location choices rather than government preferences, as 
. . . the discontinuity in units at the threshold is driven by the number of 
applications by developers rather than state housing authorities’ acceptance rate 
 
 109. See I.R.C. § 42 (2012). 
 110. Id. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III). 
 111. Id. § 42(d)(5)(B)(ii)(I). 
 112. See KHADDURI, supra note 107, at 10 nn.15–16. 
 113. I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(i) (“In the case of any building located in a qualified census tract . . . in the case 
of a new building, the eligible basis of such building shall be 130 percent of such basis determined without 
regard to this subparagraph, and … in the case of an existing building, the rehabilitation expenditures . . . shall 
be 130 percent of such expenditures determined without regard to this subparagraph.”). 
 114. McClure, supra note 40, at 165 (finding that over the studied time period, of the 458,516 LIHTC units 
developed, only 151,083 were in QCTs).  
 115. Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 90, at 655. 
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of proposed projects.”116 In other words, the QCT rules do seem to influence 
developer decisions, but not state housing agency decisions.  
Why do the QCT rules seemingly not influence state housing agency 
decisions? This is likely because the federal statute provides no guidance 
regarding how to implement the QCT preference.117 Thus, states are free to 
implement the preference as they see fit. As such, wide variance exists. Recall 
that the statute requires a preference for projects in QCTs that “contribute[] to a 
concerted community revitalization plan.”118 Yet one study of QAPs found that 
most states “simply ignore” the community revitalization plan language and that 
not a single state limits eligibility for the QCT multiplier to projects that 
contribute to such a revitalization plan.119 At least one federal district court has 
dismissed the QCT language in the LIHTC statute as being too “vague and 
amorphous to create judicially enforceable rights under § 1983.”120 Many states 
do “provide some competitive points” to projects in QCTs.121 However, the 
relative magnitude of the preference is completely within the discretion of the 
state agency to determine.  
While some have criticized the lack of specificity in the LIHTC statute,122 
the discretion afforded to states with respect to the QCT preference may in fact 
be a virtue. In implementing their QAPs, states are not bound by a particularly 
restrictive federal framework. They are not required to give any preference to 
QCT projects that do not contribute to a concerted revitalization plan. States also 
can use their discretion as they see fit, for example, awarding a relatively small 
preference to projects located in QCTs, and a relatively large preference to 
projects that establish a significant rent advantage as compared to area market 
rents. The fact that private developers disproportionately propose LIHTC 
projects in QCTs may be evidence that developers indeed are sensitive to 
program incentives.123 The federal framework does not bind the hands of states 
 
 116. Id.  
 117. See OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., EFFECT OF QAP 
INCENTIVES ON THE LOCATION OF LIHTC PROPERTIES 3 (2015) (“[W]hile the federal statute requires that states 
give ‘preference’ to projects that are located in QCTs subject to a community revitalization plan, it provides no 
specific guidance on what constitutes such a plan. Some states provide a point bonus while others use set-asides 
to prioritize development in QCTs.” (footnote omitted)).  
 118. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii)(III). 
 119. See KHADDURI, supra note 107, at 10–11; see also SARAH OPPENHEIMER, POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH 
ACTION COUNCIL, BUILDING OPPORTUNITY II: CIVIL RIGHTS BEST PRACTICES IN THE LOW INCOME HOUSING 
TAX CREDIT PROGRAM 7 (2015) (“Although nearly half of the QAPs include point systems that favor 
developments in Qualified Census Tracts (QCTs) if they contribute to a ‘concerted community revitalization 
plan,’ fewer (15) provide more explicit details on what this term in the LIHTC statute means, or what should be 
included in such a plan.”). 
 120. Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the Fair Housing Act to 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1793 (2005) (quoting DeHarder Inv. Corp. v. Ind. 
Hous. Fin. Auth., 909 F. Supp. 606, 615 (S.D. Ind. 1995)). 
 121. See KHADDURI, supra note 107, at 11. 
 122. See Roisman, supra note 11, at 1018.  
 123. See Baum-Snow & Marion, supra note 90, at 655 (“We find that developers’ location choices respond 
strongly to the tax credit incentives.”); see also McClure, supra note 40, at 166 (“However, it does suggest that 
J - WEISS_24 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2019  11:29 AM 
242 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:215 
from shifting the priorities in their QAPs to incentivize developers to make 
different locational decisions.  
C. LAND COSTS 
Another obstacle to addressing the misallocation problem concerns the cost 
of land. States might argue that no matter how they set priorities in their QAP, 
private developers will not build projects in locations where high land 
acquisition costs make development financially unattractive. The federal LIHTC 
program does not subsidize the cost of acquiring land.124 Developers thus must 
find other sources to cover these costs. The primary financial benefit to 
developers in most LIHTC projects is a large developer fee that program rules 
authorize them to take as compensation for developing the project.125 The size 
of the developer fee is not directly tied to the amount of money expended on 
land acquisition. The economics of a typical LIHTC deal, therefore, are such 
that developers are incentivized to keep land acquisition costs low.  
Where are land costs likely to be low? The answer of course is in 
neighborhoods that already have low rents. The basic economics of a LIHTC 
deal thus contribute to the misallocation problem. Developers propose projects 
where LIHTC rents are not much different from area market rents because this 
maximizes the value of the deal. States can change their QAPs to prioritize 
development elsewhere, but if this makes LIHTC deals financially unattractive, 
developers will not be incentivized to build.  
To say that a project developed in a high land cost neighborhood may be 
less attractive to developers however is not to say that it will be so unattractive 
as to prevent development. Demand for low-income housing tax credits among 
developers is extremely strong. In one study by a leading tax credit accounting 
firm, the firm found that demand for low-income housing tax credits outstripped 
supply in every state.126 In some cases, the oversubscription rate is as high as 5-
to-1—meaning that the state received applications for five times the amount of 
tax credits that are available.127 Note that this likely undercounts the true level 
of demand since it only registers the demand of developers who actually submit 
 
the boost in subsidy provided through the QCT process can have a positive influence on the location of 
investments. Possibly this positive influence could be better directed if it was tied to the presence of market need 
(demand in excess of supply) rather than the presence of poverty independent of the scale of the supply of 
affordable housing.”).  
 124. See I.R.C. § 42, Low-Income Housing Credit, at 306 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/IRC_42.pdf (“Expenses related to acquiring the land are excluded from eligible basis.”) (last revised Aug. 
11, 2015).  
 125. As an example, developer fees in California for LIHTC projects are capped at $2 million for 9% 
projects. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 4, § 10327(c)(2)(A) (2018). 4% projects are capped at $2.5 million. Id. 
§ 10327(c)(2)(B).  
 126. Michael Novogradac, In Demand: Allocation Ratios Show Strong Interest in LIHTCs, NOVOGRADAC 
& COMPANY LLP (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.novoco.com/notes-from-novogradac/demand-
allocation-ratios-show-strong-interest-lihtcs.  
 127. Id.  
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applications.128 Many others may refrain from expending the cost of preparing a 
LIHTC proposal given the high level of competitiveness.129  
There is thus room to test developer sensitivity to shifting program rules. 
Perhaps requiring that developers build in areas where land costs are higher may 
in fact reduce some of the profitability of the program for developers. And 
perhaps in certain cases this is a virtue rather than a vice—redirecting some 
private profit into public value captured in the form of affordable rental housing 
where it is actually needed to increase affordability. Until the LIHTC program 
is no longer significantly oversubscribed, states should experiment with program 
rules to obtain better locational outcomes.  
However, in certain states with relatively lower oversubscription rates, 
and/or in census tracts with particularly high land costs, it may be the case that 
LIHTC development simply is not financially attractive to developers. Under 
such conditions, the costs of land pose a formidable challenge to development. 
In such cases, if development is desirable as a public policy, government may 
need to help bear the increased costs. State and local governments already 
heavily subsidize land acquisition costs. It is not uncommon for a local 
government to provide the entire amount of upfront capital needed for land 
acquisition in the form of a significantly below-market long-term loan, often 
with the implicit assumption that the loan will be forgiven at the end of the loan 
term.130 In some cases, a governmental entity already owns land, perhaps having 
acquired it through the use of eminent domain, and dedicates the land to the 
development of affordable housing. There is thus significant precedent for state 
and local government involvement in overcoming land acquisition barriers for 
LIHTC projects. 
In order to reduce the burden this would add to state and local government 
budgets, some states have already begun experimenting with innovative 
initiatives. For example, Massachusetts recently passed a program, modeled on 
similar programs in Illinois and Missouri, called the Donation Tax Credit 
(DTC).131 The DTC provides tax credits to owners who donate properties to 
qualified nonprofits for use as long-term affordable housing.132 The tax credit is 
worth 50% of the value of the donated property.133 The program is intended to 
leverage the value of the federal charitable tax deduction, which, on its own, is 
often insufficient to incentivize land donation. Coupling the federal charitable 
deduction with the state DTC, however, provides property owners with a strong 
incentive to donate land, while allowing the state to share the burden of foregone 
tax revenue with the federal government. Since 2001, the Illinois version of the 
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. See Weiss, supra note 15, at 538. 
 131. Andrew Spofford, The Donation Tax Credit—a New Affordable Housing Tool for Massachusetts, 
NOVOGRADAC & COMPANY LLP (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.novoco.com/periodicals/articles/donation-tax-
credit-new-affordable-housing-tool-massachusetts. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
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program has enabled the creation or preservation of approximately 18,000 
affordable housing units.134  
The DTC and federal charitable exemption can thus work as 
complementary programs to the LIHTC program—with the DTC and federal 
charitable exemption helping to subsidize land acquisition costs and the LIHTC 
program helping to subsidize development costs. Other states could adopt 
similar programs, while experimenting with the specific provisions. For 
example, perhaps the size of a donation tax credit could be reduced—maybe a 
30% state tax credit, coupled with the federal charitable deduction, would be 
sufficient to induce land donation from parties already somewhat motivated to 
dedicate their land to a public purpose. While of course the introduction of a new 
state tax credit is not revenue neutral, higher costs or less total units produced 
may be the price necessary to allow the LIHTC program to meet the goal of 
providing access to otherwise unaffordable neighborhoods. 
D. LOCAL POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
Assuming state HFA autonomy concerns, federal framework limitations, 
and land cost barriers could all be overcome, states might encounter a final 
barrier to addressing the misallocation problem: namely, local political 
opposition. Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) is now a well-known 
phenomenon.135 The political opposition of neighborhoods with relatively 
higher market rents no doubt contributes to the misallocation problem, as 
developers select projects that are less likely to encounter extended and costly 
entitlement battles.  
Part of this opposition stems from a lack of information. Modern LIHTC 
development is not the subsidized housing of decades past. Rather, a modern 
LIHTC project typically bears little resemblance to the popularly ingrained 
images of a Cabrini Green or Pruitt-Igoe-style public housing project.136 LIHTC 
developments are regularly low-density, well-designed projects that blend in 
with modern market rate development. Nor have LIHTC projects been found to 
lead to an increase in crime, even when located in higher-income 
neighborhoods.137 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 499–500 (1994) 
(“Local opposition to low-income housing often focuses on efforts to pressure local governments to use their 
zoning and land use powers to exclude such units. In accommodation of such pressure, many municipalities have 
adopted a variety of techniques: requirements for large building lots; restrictions on the ability to subdivide 
property into smaller lots; restrictions on new hookups to sewers, drinking water lines, and other utilities; 
exactions (such as fees to reimburse the municipality for the development’s impacts on parks, schools, or other 
public facilities); expensive construction and design standards; construction moratoria; and zoning that prohibits 
multi-family dwellings.”).  
 136. For a description of the stereotypical perception of public housing, see Alexander Hoffman, High-Rise 
Hellholes, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/high-rise-hellholes.  
 137. Rebecca Diamond & Timothy McQuade, Who Wants Affordable Housing in Their Backyard? An 
Equilibrium Analysis of Low Income Property Development 20 (Stanford Graduate School of Business, Working 
Paper No. 3329, 2017), https://web.stanford.edu/~diamondr/LIHTC_spillovers.pdf. 
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These facts notwithstanding, research shows that higher-income white 
households have a negative preference for proximity to LIHTC developments.138 
According to a study by Rebecca Diamond and Tim McQuade, in neighborhoods 
with median incomes above $54,000 and where the nonwhite population is 
below 50%, LIHTC construction leads to housing price declines of roughly 2.5% 
within 0.1 miles of the LIHTC project.139 The authors state, “Such results 
suggest that white households may have a preference for neighborhood 
homogeneity, which interacts with how they view the amenities/disamenities 
provided by LIHTC construction.”140  
Federal fair housing laws exist to counteract this “preference for 
neighborhood homogeneity.” Not all purported individual preferences are 
viewed the same in the eyes of the law. State and local governments that receive 
federal financial assistance have a duty to affirmatively further fair housing.141 
As such, state governments should ensure that NIMBYism does not prevent 
otherwise worthy LIHTC projects from being developed in locations where they 
would serve the purpose of increasing affordability.  
State governments have already experimented with measures aimed at 
curbing local political opposition to affordable housing. For decades in 
Massachusetts, state law known as Chapter 40B has allowed a developer of an 
affordable housing project that is denied approval by the local zoning board to 
appeal directly to a state appeals committee.142 In September 2017, California 
enacted SB 35, a state law that establishes a “streamlined, ministerial approval 
process” for proposed multifamily housing developments in localities that are 
failing to meet state-mandated housing production targets. The law explicitly 
prohibits local regulatory discrimination against projects on the basis of their 
receipt of “public investment in housing affordability.”143 Other states would be 
wise to follow suit.  
CONCLUSION 
Despite record levels of wealth and relatively steady growth in per capita 
real gross domestic product for decades,144 the United States continues to 
 
 138. Id. at 31, 35.  
 139. Id. at 2. 
 140. Id. at 35. 
 141. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2012); 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.150–58, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903 (2018).  
 142. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 22 (2018) (“Whenever an application filed under the provisions of section 
twenty-one is denied, or is granted with such conditions and requirements as to make the building or operation 
of such housing uneconomic, the applicant shall have the right to appeal to the housing appeals committee in the 
department of community affairs for a review of the same.”).  
 143. See S.B. 35, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 144. See Kerry Close, Americans’ Total Wealth Reaches Record High, TIME (June 9, 2016), 
http://time.com/money/4363471/americans-total-wealth-record-high/ (reporting that in the first quarter of 2016, 
total U.S. wealth reached a record high of $88.1 trillion); FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS, FRED ECONOMIC 
DATA: REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA (2018), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A939RX0Q048SBEA (last updated Oct. 26, 2018) (charting the steadily 
increasing U.S. per capita real GDP from 1950 to 2018). 
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struggle with the persistent problem that a significant portion of its population 
is unable to afford decent housing. The LIHTC program is the primary, and 
essentially only, federal program aimed at subsidizing the development of new 
housing for low-income households. Yet states appear to be allocating much of 
this $8-billion-dollar annual incentive with a lack of precision regarding 
locational outcomes.  
Approximately three quarters of states do not make it a threshold 
requirement or even an explicit scoring advantage in the competition for 
LIHTCs that a proposed project offer rents that are below local market rents. 
Rather, the majority of these states focus in large measure on ensuring that a 
proposed project will be financially feasible—a necessary but insufficient factor 
in determining whether a proposed project will successfully serve the goals of 
the program. Financial feasibility may indicate that the project is increasing 
affordable housing opportunities; or it may indicate that a LIHTC project is 
merely crowding out housing that the private market otherwise would have 
provided or increasing housing quality without optimizing any other 
programmatic goals.  
As such, states should do a better job of ensuring that their QAP rules for 
allocating tax credits are calibrated to achieving the purposes of the program. 
Specifically, as a default, all states should follow the lead of the handful of states 
that already make it a threshold requirement of receiving a LIHTC award to 
prove that a proposed project will offer rents that are at least ten percent below 
area market rents. 
There may be certain scenarios in which this default requirement can be 
overridden—I can foresee two. First, the default could be overridden where a 
developer can make a convincing case that a proposed project is located in a 
gentrifying neighborhood with rents likely to escalate rapidly in the near future. 
In such a neighborhood, while not offering a rent advantage immediately, the 
rent-restricted LIHTC housing will serve to preserve housing affordability that 
otherwise would be lost as market rents rise. Second, the default could be 
overridden where a project is located in a neighborhood with a robust 
neighborhood revitalization plan in place. In such a neighborhood, the positive 
spillover effects of a LIHTC project as a vehicle to further revitalization efforts 
could warrant development even where no significant rent advantage exists. 
Setting a ten percent advantage as the default rule however would orient state 
HFAs in a manner that ensures below-market rents are obtained barring a 
compelling reason to the contrary. This would be a far different regime than the 
current prevailing one in which tax credits can be awarded to projects that do 
not offer a rent advantage, are not located in a gentrifying neighborhood, and do 
not contribute to a concerted neighborhood revitalization plan.  
States no doubt will encounter obstacles to addressing the misallocation 
problem. States lack the autonomy to propose the location of new LIHTC 
projects and must simply select among the best private developer proposals. The 
federal QCT rules require a state preference for projects located in relatively 
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low-income areas. Land costs likely are to be higher and NIMBY sentiments 
stronger in many areas where LIHTC projects would offer a rent advantage.  
Yet, states have a number of options at their disposal that they should use 
to overcome such obstacles. They hold significant leverage over private 
developers in their ability to set strategic QAP priorities and developer decisions 
appear to be sensitive to those priorities. Federal rules are vague and allow 
significant discretion in setting the relative priority of preferences. The 
competition for LIHTCs is high, affording room to test developer sensitivity to 
rule changes that may increase land costs; and where such experiments fail, the 
government should step in with innovative programs to subsidize the cost of 
land, even if the price to pay for an effective program is higher costs or less total 
output. Additionally, the misperceptions of neighbors about what a modern 
subsidized housing project looks like based on dated stereotypes, or the 
preferences of local neighbors for racial homogeneity, are exactly what our 
federal and state fair housing laws are aimed to address. State governments, in 
living up to their duty to affirmatively further fair housing, should consider state-
level appeals and streamlined approval processes for affordable housing projects 
that face unwarranted neighborhood opposition.  
All of these measures—a ten percent default rent advantage with limited 
exceptions, strategic prioritizing of QAP preferences, innovative land 
acquisition assistance programs, state-level appeals and streamlined approval 
processes—together can help to ensure that our federal subsidized housing 
policy meets its goal of increasing affordable housing for low-income 
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